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It is health that is real wealth and not pieces of gold and silver.1
– Mahatma Gandhi
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care reform is one of the hottest topics in America. One
need look no further than this year’s election cycle to see that health
care reform was one of the main platforms for nearly every candidate
for the 2020 election.2 Why is this the case? Healthcare costs amount
to 17.9% of the overall Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).3 This fig-
ure is shockingly high, especially when compared to health care costs
of similarly situated countries.4 As it currently stands, the United
States ranks at the top of per capita health care spending.5 Therefore,
it should sadden the soul of our nation that our health care outcomes
are among the lowest in the world.6 In addition to this cost inefficiency
and ineffective care, millions of Americans are without affordable
health insurance options.7 Emergency rooms have become the only
option for medical treatment, which has exacerbated the rising costs
1. Mahatma Gandhi
2. Health Care as a Human Right – Medicare For All, BERNIE, https://
berniesanders.com/en/issues/medicare-for-all/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020) [https://per
ma.cc/749L-NQVB]; Health Care, KAMALA, http://kamalaharris.org/issue/health-care/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YMB3-6M68]; Issues, PETE FOR
AMERICA, https://peteforamerica.com/issues/#Freedom (last visited Jan. 12, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/SX5C-MV37]; Joe’s Vision for America, JOE BIDEN, https://joebiden
.com/joes-vision/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2FJR-NC25].
3. Anne B. Martin et al., National Health Care Spending in 2017: Growth Slows
to Post-Great Recession Rates; Share of GDP Stabilizes, 38 HEALTH AFF. 96, 96,
https://www.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05085.
4. Jeffrey Selberg et al., A Generation of Health Care in the United States: Has
Value Improved in the Last 25 Years?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER




6. Bradley Sawyer & Daniel McDermott, How Does the Quality of the U.S.
Healthcare System Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH SYS.
TRACKER (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/qual
ity-u-s-healthcare-system-compare-countries/#item-overall-mortality-rate-1980-2015
[https://perma.cc/3QZ6-E723].
7. Rachel Garfield et al., The Uninsured and the ACA: A Primer – Key Facts
About Health Insurance and the Uninsured Amidst Changes to the Affordable Care
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of health care.8 Every person, whether directly or indirectly, is af-
fected by health care costs.9 Solving this problem will take a multi-
faceted approach, and there are countless opinions on the best strat-
egy to correct the direction of American health care.
One approach that has gained popularity with health-industry
stakeholders and regulators alike is value-based payment reform.10
Value-based payment models encourage integration and coordination
of care across all levels of participation in the care team.11 Instead of a
traditional fee-for-service payment model, the value-based payment
models incentivize collaboration by the sharing of savings or increased
profits with the healthcare team.12 The healthcare team realizes incen-
tive-based payments only if there is accompanying proof that the pa-
tient care is improving while saving the federal program money.13
While there have been a handful of limited opportunities for this type
of collaboration among providers, this program has not been widely
adopted due to regulatory barriers that have impeded this type of re-
form.14 Health care fraud and abuse laws are one of the main barriers
that limit the business arrangements and financial relationships that
exist between hospitals, physicians, and other health care service prov-
iders, thus limiting new payment options to support a value-based
payment model.15
8. Sawyer & McDermott, supra note 6.
9. See American Health Care: Health Spending and the Federal Budget, COMMIT-
TEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (May 16, 2018), https://www.crfb.org/papers/
american-health-care-health-spending-and-federal-budget [https://perma.cc/DLE8-K2
VF].
10. See THOMAS BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH § 4.5 (7th ed. 2016).
11. See Value-Based Insurance Design Model (VBID), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2019), http://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/value-
based-insurance-design-model-vbid-fact-sheet-cy-2020 [https://perma.cc/EL5Z-
XHGU].
12. Value-Based Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/Value-
Based-Programs/Value-Based-Programs.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://per
ma.cc/47LJ-ZMAC].
13. HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. 2–3 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning
-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet
_ICN907664.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5D6-X3T8].
14. John O’Shea, Patient-Centered, Value-Based Health Care Is Incompatible With
The Current Climate of Excessive Regulation, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180927.405697/full/ [https://perma.cc/
WG45-6FRR]. The term “Federal health care program” is defined as “any plan or
program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or other-
wise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government,”
or “any State health care program, as defined in section 1128(h).” Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 204(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1936, 2000 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320f (2011)).
15. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, Modernizing Stark Law to Ensure the Successful Transition
from Volume to Value in the Medicare Program (July 17, 2018), https://www.aha.org/
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The Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Physician Self-Referral
Law, and the False Claims Act (“FCA”) are three of the main health
care fraud and abuse laws that are used to deter fraudsters from abus-
ing Medicare and Medicaid programs.16 The AKS statute prohibits the
payment or receipt of remuneration in exchange for health care refer-
rals.17 The Physician Self-Referral Law, also known as the “Stark law”
(“Stark”), prohibits a physician from referring patients for a desig-
nated health service to an entity that has a financial relationship with
the physician or one of the physician’s immediate family members.18
The FCA is used to bring a claim against a person who submits a false
or fraudulent bill to the government for reimbursement.19 These three
laws work in tandem to prevent fraud and abuse of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.20 Alleged violations of the AKS and the Stark
law are often litigated through the use of the FCA, which allows for
qui tam actions.21 While these laws serve an essential role in protect-
ing patients from unnecessary medical treatment, overutilization of
services, unfair competition, and general abuse of the federal pro-
grams,22 these laws are also blocking innovation in health care re-
quired to address the need for alternative models for health care
delivery and payment.23
Additionally, compliance with these health care fraud and abuse
laws is often difficult, even for the well-meaning who in good faith
attempt to understand the requirements under the law.24 Numerous
regulations and interpretive laws have been created in an effort to
clarify how to implement and interpret these fraud and abuse laws.
Guidance from both the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) and the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) has been very
limited due to the relatively small number of advisory opinions issued
system/files/2018-07/180718-aha-statement-house-ways-means-stark-law.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P2E7-HEBM].
16. A Road Map for New Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/56YV-S27G].
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) (2012).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3729–33 (2012).
20. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2012); see also John W. Nisbett, The Three-Headed Mon-
ster of Health Care Fraud Enforcement: The False Claims Act, Stark Law, and the




22. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16.
23. Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based
Purchasing in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 442, 455–57 (2009).
24. See United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 395 (4th Cir.
2015) (Wynn, J., concurring).
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over the years.25 Moreover, there is evidence that the guidance has
been misused by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).26 There is scant
case law on many of the possible health care arrangements because
stakeholders either shy away from entering into these arrangements
for fear of violating a vague and ambiguous rule, or they settle with
the DOJ to avoid litigation for fear of ruinous financial consequences
of fighting the government.27 The law must be reformed to provide
clarity and opportunity for innovation.
As health care has dramatically evolved over the last three de-
cades,28 so must the laws that were meant to prevent abuse in the
health care system. Laws that were once relevant based on the tradi-
tional payment models are now largely irrelevant and an impediment
to necessary change that will improve health care costs and outcomes.
Due to the incredibly complex and numerous business relationships
that exist in any given health care system, initiating change will be
difficult. However, one approach that will alleviate the stress on hos-
pitals and providers is to reform the Stark law to create an exception
for value-based payment models,29 as well as to provide clarity for
language currently included in the Stark law.30 I contend that these
regulatory changes would enable hospitals and providers to create
new arrangements that would focus on patient care, unobstructed by
the myriad regulations that have prevented this type of collaboration.
In Part II of this Article, I will examine the United States’ health
care crisis and how it led to increased enforcement of the fraud and
abuse laws that help deter the abuse in the system.31 Part III will
center on the analysis of the fraud and abuse laws mentioned above
and on how these laws work together to help prevent fraud in health
care.32 In Part IV of this Article, I will discuss several necessary
changes to the Stark law to help correct the direction of our health
care spending and outcomes.33 I propose that a value-based exception
25. See Advisory Opinions (AOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/advisory_opin
ions.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2019, 6:48 AM) [https://perma.cc/T377-SPSE]; Advi-
sory Opinions, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opin
ions/index.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8G23-H6NE].
26. See Memorandum from the Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to the Heads of Civil Litigating Components and United States Attorneys,
Limiting Use of Agency Guidance Documents In Affirmative Civil Enforcement
Cases (Jan. 25, 2018).
27. See Tuomey, 675 F.3d at 394; Pete Strom, Tuomey Could File Bankruptcy for
Medicare Fraud Payments, STROM L. FIRM (May 7, 2014), https://stromlaw.com/
tuomey-file-bankruptcy-medicare-fraud-payments/ [https://perma.cc/4XNH-4EEJ].
28. Thomas P. Conklin, Health Care in the United States: An Evolving System, 7
MICH. FAM. REV. 5, 5 (2002).
29. Claiborne et al., supra note 23, at 486–87.
30. Id. at 488.
31. See discussion infra Part II.
32. See discussion infra Part III.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
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be added to the current exceptions, as well as discuss the need for
clarity of several critical terms to understand how to comply with the
Stark exceptions. Additionally, I propose that the rules regarding ad-
visory opinions should be amended to provide more guidance to the
health care industry on these complicated issues. These changes, I
contend, will relieve the barriers that are blocking the health care in-
dustry from making transformative changes and meeting the goal of
higher quality care and increased efficiency.
II. THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS MOVES LAWMAKERS TO INCREASE
FRAUD AND ABUSE ENFORCEMENT
During the Democratic primary debate hosted on June 26, 2019, the
first few minutes were dominated by debating the American health
care system. Politicians jockeyed for an opportunity to share their pol-
icies regarding the future of health care while they debated ideas such
as Medicare for All, universal coverage, and how private insurance
coverage fits into the solution.34 Senator Elizabeth Warren pointed
out that insurance companies last year alone “sucked $23 billion in
profits out of the health care system, and that doesn’t count the
money that was paid to executives, [and] the money that was spent on
lobbying Washington.”35 Former Congressman John Delaney stated
that in campaigning at over 400 events, “the number-one issue the
American people [want to know] about . . . [is] what [they are] going
to do for health care.”36 Each candidate that spoke agreed that there
needed to be a change in our approach to providing health care be-
cause millions of Americans are not receiving care due to the high
costs.37
To clarify, this issue is not just a concern to the Democratic party.
On June 24, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order requir-
ing hospitals and insurers to disclose their prices in hopes that price
transparency would create informed consumers, competition among
providers, and ultimately, lower prices for the American people.38
34. See Jeremia Kimelman, Full Transcript: 2019 Democratic Debate Night One,






38. Exec. Order No. 13,877, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,849 (June 24, 2019); see also Susannah
Luthi, Trump’s Transparency Executive Order Leaves Details to HHS, CMS, MOD.
HEALTH CARE (June 24, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/pay
ment/trumps-transparency-executive-order-leaves-details-hhs-cms [https://perma.cc/
84RQ-K2KB]. There is debate, as in all things involving health care, as to whether this
will in fact help lower prices. Some health care stakeholders have argued this ap-
proach of requiring price disclosure perpetuates the idea of paying for volume over
value. CEO Matt Eyles of American Health Insurance Plans noted this could be a
boost to the fee-for-service system that the government is trying to get away from. Id.
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Likewise, in May of 2019, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (“HHS”) and CMS issued a final rule requiring pharmaceutical
transparency pricing for television advertisements, expecting that the
disclosure of this information would force down drug prices.39 This
topic is at the forefront of American policy as politicians on both sides
of the aisle want to reduce costs so that Americans have access to
health care.
Spending on health care is at an all-time high. In the words of War-
ren Buffet, “The ballooning costs of health care act as a hungry tape-
worm on the American economy.”40 American health care spending
increased 3.9% in 2017 to reach $3.5 trillion dollars.41 The United
States ranks highest per capita on health care spending in the world.42
In 2017, health spending per person was $10,224,43 which was 28%
higher than Switzerland, the second highest per capita spender.44 The
overall GDP related to health care spending was 17.9% in 2017.45
These numbers have been on an upward trend for years.46 In the well-
known and often-cited article, “It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United
States Is So Different From Other Countries,” lead author Gerard
Anderson and his coauthors examined the data published by the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
to compare the United States spending on health care to that of the
thirty member countries in 2000.47 Their analysis of the data reflected
that while the United States spent considerably more on health care
39. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Regulation to Require Drug Pricing Trans-
parency, 84 Fed. Reg. 20,732 (May 10, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403); see
also John Commins, Final Rule Requires Drug Price Disclosures in TV Ads, HEALTH-
LEADERS (May 8, 2019), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/final-rule-requires-
drug-price-disclosures-tv-ads [https://perma.cc/R5D5-74RM].
40. Nick Wingfield et al., Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Team Up
to Try to Disrupt Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/30/technology/amazon-berkshire-hathaway-jpmorgan-health-care.html
[https://perma.cc/MVF6-BPUE].
41. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., National Health Expenditures
2017 Highlights (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KH4-CPQ2] [hereinafter National Health Expenditures 2017].
42. Id.
43. Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Com-
pare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-
countries/ [https://perma.cc/7UVN-XFKC]. CMS lists this price per capita as $10,739
in 2017, which would make the gap between the United States and Switzerland even
greater. See National Health Expenditures 2017, supra note 41.
44. Sawyer & Cox, supra note 43.
45. National Health Expenditures 2017, supra note 41.
46. Health Spending, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://data
.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
4JLH-LVSQ].
47. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So
Different From Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, at 89, 103, https://doi.
org/10.1377/hlthaff.22.3.89.
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than any country—both per capita and percentage of GDP—the mea-
sures of aggregate usage, such as physician visits per capita and hospi-
tal days per capita, were below the OECD median.48 This implied that
patients in the United States pay higher prices than patients in other
countries.49 The problem, however, is linked to many other factors in
addition to the price.50
Many health-law commentators argue that the health care delivery
models are a key part of the problem. In the earliest phases of com-
mercial health insurance plans, health insurance companies simply in-
demnified their insureds for the cost of care.51 Generally speaking, if
the insured went to see a doctor and received a bill for $80, the insur-
ance company sent a check to the doctor for $80. The insurance com-
pany was not involved in choosing the providers or determining what
was medically necessary for the patient or insured.52 It simply wrote
checks to cover the cost of care.53 The physicians named their prices
and the insurance companies paid them.54 However, the advent of
managed care plans in the 1980s dramatically changed the relation-
ships between insurer, patient, and provider.55
Managed care entered the health care scene as an attempt to con-
trol skyrocketing health care costs.56 The insurance companies per-
suaded the public that they would be able to keep prices down by
negotiating on behalf of patients and by providing another check in
the system to ensure that physicians would not perform unnecessary
services to increase their profit margins.57 The insurance companies
would intervene and stop the runaway prices being charged by physi-
cians and hospitals. The managed-care companies still operated in a
fee-for-service model,58 in which each service had a separate fee. The
48. Id. at 103.
49. Id.
50. Corbin Santo, Note, Walking a Tightrope: Regulating Medicare Fraud and
Abuse and the Transition to Value-Based Payment, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1377,
1385 (2014).
51. Id. at 1379. See Louis S. Reed, Private Health Insurance in the United States:
An Overview, SOC. SECURITY BULL., Dec. 1965, at 3, 6, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/
docs/ssb/v28n12/v28n12p3.pdf; see also D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGER-
FORD, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 2–3 (Cong.
Res. Serv. 2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/MrktStrOfHlthIns.pdf.
52. See AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra note 51, at 3, 11.
53. See id.
54. Cf.  INST. OF MED., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT
RISK 68 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993) (noting shift in Blue Cross
Blue Shield Plan to providing services rather than cash payments).
55. Jon Gabel et al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1988, at 48, 49, 51–52, https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.7.3.48.
56. Anderson et al., supra note 47, at 91; see also AUSTIN & HUNGERFORD, supra
note 51, at 1, 31.
57. Elizabeth W. Hoy, Change and Growth in Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Win-
ter 1991, at 18, 19, https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.10.4.18.
58. See THOMAS BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH § 6.4 (7th ed. 2016).
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insurance company paid a negotiated rate with the “in-network” doc-
tor for the service, and in addition, the patient would pay whatever
cost-sharing obligation was required on her part.59 This model rewards
a higher volume of services with a higher profit rather than focusing
on the quality of services provided.60 In essence, a doctor is not paid
more when she cures the patient, but rather she is paid more if the
patient comes back to the office multiple times for additional
services.61
Managed care did not promise what the public had hoped. Prices
continue to rise, and new health insurance plans have emerged with
the promise of keeping costs down. The high deductible health plan is
one of these plans that provides low premiums and does not provide
coverage for most services until the patient has met a high annual de-
ductible amount.62 This plan keeps in check the idea of moral haz-
ard.63 Nevertheless, critics argue that it exposes the patient to high
costs and discourages people from seeking necessary care.64
59. Managed Care: Summary, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/managed-
care.html (last updated May 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZX6Y-R4CW]. There are nu-
merous types of managed-care plans. Most plans involve a network of providers that
have contracted with the managed-care company to provide discounted rates for ser-
vices. Under some plans, the patient can go outside of the network of providers but
will be exposed to a greater portion of the cost. Plans vary between whether you need
to see a primary care physician before getting a referral for a specialist, or whether
you can go directly to a specialist. Plans vary by the amount of deductible, co-insur-
ance exposure, premium rates, and many other factors. See id. Cost sharing obliga-
tions refer to the amount of costs for which the patient is responsible. This can include
co-pays, deductibles, or co-insurance percentages. Kevin Haney, After Health Insur-
ance Pays Medical Bills, GROWING FAM. BENEFITS (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.grow-
ingfamilybenefits.com/after-insurance-pays-medical-bills/ [https://perma.cc/GK6F-
GD3J].
60. See generally THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROV-
ING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 173 (Pierre L. Yong et al. eds., 2010).
61. Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2015), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande [https://perma.cc/PX3J-824F].
62. These plans are usually accompanied with a Health Saving Account (“HSA”).
The IRS allows contributions to the HSA that will not be taxed, and the money can be
used to go towards the high deductibles. DEP’T TREASURY, PUBLICATION 969:
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANS (2018)
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p969 [https://perma.cc/X2JY-74SM].
63. Moral Hazard is the idea that patients will use more services, even if they are
not needed, because they are not paying for it directly. Therefore, if the patient must
pay for the services via a deductible payment, she will only use what is actually neces-
sary. Mark Thoma, Explainer: What Is “Moral Hazard”?, CBS MONEYWATCH (Nov.
22, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/explainer-moral-hazard/ [https://
perma.cc/6N5W-MGF2].
64. Rachel Martin, Employees Start to Feel the Squeeze of High-Deductible Health
Plans, NPR (May 3, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/05/03/71951
9579/employees-start-to-feel-the-squeeze-of-high-deductible-health-plans [https://per
ma.cc/B5FS-2Q4E].
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Medicare,65 with its numerous parts and options, as well as the
many variations of Medicaid66 across our country, employ various
health plans to manage care and costs. In 2017, Medicare spending
grew 4.2% to $705.9 billion.67 Total Medicaid spending decelerated in
2017, increasing just 2.9% to $581.9 billion compared to a growth in
2016 to 4.2%.68 Even with the United States’ astronomical figures for
health care spending, the data reveals that the United States is per-
forming subpar for population health compared to similar OECD
countries.69 The United States ranked last among its peers in amena-
ble mortality rates.70 This data shows that health care is not delivered
effectively in our nation.71 The problem is draining the vitality of our
national economy and failing millions of Americans.
The Department of Health and Human Services and CMS are
working to find solutions. CMS’s Innovation Center is testing various
payment and service-delivery models that aim to achieve better care
for patients, smarter spending, and healthier communities.72 Value-
based payment reform is one delivery model that has been gaining
65. An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www
.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/an-overview-of-medicare/ [https://perma.cc/HBL7-
6AGT] (“Medicare is the federal health insurance program created in 1965 for people
ages 65 and over, regardless of income, medical history, or health status. The program
was expanded in 1972 to cover certain people under age 65 who have a long-term
disability. Today, Medicare plays a key role in providing health and financial security
to 60 million older people and younger people with disabilities. The program helps to
pay for many medical care services, including hospitalizations, physician visits, pre-
scription drugs, preventive services, skilled nursing facility and home health care, and
hospice care. In 2017, Medicare spending accounted for 15% of total federal spending
and 20% of total national health spending.”).
66. CMS Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/index (last updated Nov. 13,
2019) [https://perma.cc/K7CM-V27H] (“On July 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. John-
son signed into law the bill that led to the Medicare and Medicaid. . . . At first, Medi-
caid gave medical insurance to people getting cash assistance. Today, a much larger
group is covered: low-income families, pregnant women, people of all ages with disa-
bilities, and people who need long-term care. States can tailor their Medicaid pro-
grams to best serve the people in their state, so there’s a wide variation in the services
across the country.”).
67. National Health Expenditures 2017, supra note 41.
68. Id. However, the deceleration in growth was tied to “slower growth in enroll-
ment and a reduction in the Medicaid net cost of health insurance. State and local
Medicaid expenditures grew to 6.4 percent, while federal Medicaid expenditures in-
creased to 0.8 percent in 2017.” Id.
69. Sawyer & Cox, supra note 43.
70. Michael Winter, Health Survey Ranks U.S. Last Among Rich Peers, USA TO-
DAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/16/health-survey-us-last/10
638811/ (last updated June 17, 2014) [https://perma.cc/92F9-CJ6B]. “Mortality amena-
ble to health care is a measure of the rates of death considered preventable by timely
and effective care. While the health care system might not be expected to prevent
death in all instances, differences in amendable [sic] mortality indicate how effectively
health care is delivered.” Sawyer & McDermott, supra note 6.
71. Sawyer & Cox, supra note 43.
72. Where Innovation Is Happening, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NY42-LU5A].
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popularity as a possible solution to skyrocketing costs and poor pa-
tient outcomes.73
Value-based reimbursement models were launched by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).74 When the ACA was
enacted, it included incentives for value-based payment models such
as the Medicare Shared Savings Program.75 Additional value-based
payment models were tested and used with limited adoption, such as
bundled payments, variations on Accountable Care Organizations
(“ACO”), medical home models, and special payments to physicians
for care coordination.76 The promise of these new models is that, by
incentivizing providers to show data of improved quality of care in-
stead of increasing volume, they will result in health care cost savings
and a healthier population. However, there are regulatory barriers
that exist and are impeding full adoption of value-based care.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS
SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN THE MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID PROGRAMS
As mentioned in Part II above, $3.5 trillion dollars was spent in
2017 on health care in the United States.77 The government paid for
approximately 37% of those costs through Medicare and Medicaid.78
The sheer volume of claims that are processed by Medicare and Medi-
caid each year makes this a fertile area for fraud to go undetected. In
an attempt to put an end to the fraud and abuse in the system, which
adds to the problem of increased health care costs, the United States
government began to allocate more resources to fraud enforcement.79
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services Office
of the Inspector General, along with state and federal law enforce-
ment, initiated an unprecedented nationwide health care fraud take-
down in June 2018 which resulted in over 600 defendants in fifty-eight
districts and recovered over $2 billion dollars for the government.80
73. See Bruce Merlin Fried & Jeremy David Sherer, Value Based Reimbursement:
The Rock Thrown Into the Health Care Pond, HEALTH AFF. (July 8, 2016), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160708.055764/full/ [https://perma.cc/DVC6-
SQMR].
74. See Karen Kane, How Much Does Quality Cost? Analyzing the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordability Care Act’s Value-Based Purchasing Provision and How it Could
Affect the Delivery of Care by Hospitals, 14 DUQUESNE BUS. L.J. 69, 71 (2011).
75. Fried & Sherer, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. National Health Expenditures 2017, supra note 41.
78. Id.
79. DAVID E. MATYAS ET AL., LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE: NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES 1–2 (4th ed. 2012).
80. 2018 National Health Care Fraud Takedown, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/media-materials/2018/takedown/2018
HealthCareTakedown_FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXX8-J6R7].
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The government has been successful in curtailing this illegal behav-
ior.81 Multi-agency initiatives such as “strike teams” have been cre-
ated to combat fraud in various regions across the United States that
are high targets for health care fraud and abuse activities.82 Addition-
ally, the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and
Human Services, through the Health Care Fraud Prevention and En-
forcement Action Team (“HEAT”) effort, use data analytics and sur-
veillance to crack down on, prevent, and prosecute health care
fraud.83 As a result of these increased efforts and the coordination
among the local, state, and federal government, the government has
been able to recover $4 for every $1 spent on enforcement.84
Historically, most health care fraud was enforced primarily through
the use of the FCA.85 This law prohibits false or fraudulent claims
from being submitted to the government for reimbursement.86 The
law has been interpreted to include factually false claims, such as sub-
mitting a bill for a service that was never rendered,87 and legally false
claims, such as submitting a bill that is based on a physician’s inappro-
priate self-referral, thus violating the Stark law.88 Nonetheless, over
the last two decades, the DOJ has increased enforcement of Stark and
AKS in their own right as well, in addition to the expansion of claims
that may be brought under the FCA.
This Part will first give a brief overview of the AKS and the FCA in
order to provide context for the discussion of the Stark law. Next, this
Part will review the evolution of the Stark law. Moreover, the ambigu-
ity and uncertainty of interpreting Stark law and its impact on the
health care industry will be analyzed. This will be followed by a dis-
cussion of the role of guidance documents and their involvement in
81. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CON-
TROL PROGRAM REPORT 1–2 (Feb. 2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/
FY2015-hcfac.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KBV-NYDX].
82. Id. at 8–11.
83. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE 18-416, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES RETURN $2.6 BILLION IN TAXPAYER SAVINGS FROM
EFFORTS TO FIGHT HEALTHCARE FRAUD (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/department-justice-and-health-and-human-services-return-26-billion-taxpayer-sav-
ings-efforts [https://perma.cc/JM7G-8EEY].
84. Id. (“Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and Attorney General
Jeff Sessions today released a fiscal year (FY) 2017 Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Control Program report showing that for every dollar the federal government spent
on health care related fraud and abuse investigations in the last three years, the gov-
ernment recovered $4.”).
85. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2017).
86. U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., A
ROADMAP FOR NEW PHYSICIANS: AVOIDING MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE 3
(2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/roadmap_web_version_
pdf [https://perma.cc/5SRS-3VJV].
87. See id. at 4 (noting inappropriate self-referral violates Stark); see also Nisbett,
supra note 21.
88. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 86, at 3.
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adding to the confusion about what kind of behavior is allowed and
what is prohibited.
A. The AKS as a Tool to Combat Health Care Fraud
The current federal AKS89 is a criminal statute that makes it a fel-
ony for individuals or entities knowingly and willfully to offer, pay,90
solicit, or receive91 any remuneration in order to induce business reim-
bursed under any federal health care program.92 Although laws
prohibiting kickbacks have existed for almost a hundred years,93 the
first version of the health care anti-kickback provisions was passed as
part of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 to bolster public con-
fidence in the integrity of the Medicaid and Medicare programs.94
This first iteration of AKS left many questions unanswered, including
what level of intent, if any, was required under AKS, as well as other
core questions, such as what constituted a kickback.95 Since 1972,
AKS has been amended several times, which has resulted in an expan-
sion of the law. Nowadays, any type of remuneration triggers scrutiny,
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
90. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
91. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
92. The actual language of Subsection 1128B(b)(1) of the Social Security Act,
amended in August 1996, provides as follows:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or rec-
ommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal
health care program, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A)–(B).
Subsection 1128B(b)(2) of the Social Security Act provides:
(2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (in-
cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or co-
vertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person—
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall
be guilty of a felony . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A)–(B).
93. Copeland Anti-Kickback Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 73-324, 48 Stat. 948, 73d
Cong., Sess. 2 (1934) (amending and further fortifying the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931).
94. ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE § 2:4 &
n.1 (2019).
95. See id. at § 2:4.
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and specific intent is no longer necessary to violate AKS.96 Penalties
for violating AKS include both civil and criminal monetary penalties,
imprisonment, and exclusion from participating in the federal pro-
grams.97 Currently, enforcement of AKS is responsible for billions of
dollars in recovery for the federal government each year.98
AKS contains both exceptions and safe harbors that describe spe-
cific examples of when the exchange of referrals for remuneration
may be deemed “safe” and not a violation of the AKS.99 If an individ-
ual or entity complies with the exact language of a safe-harbor provi-
sion or exception, they will be safe from prosecution. If the
arrangement does not fall within the exact language of a safe-harbor
provision or exception, however, it still may be an acceptable relation-
ship. In this sense, the arrangement should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis to determine if there is a risk of fraud or abuse, and the
prosecution would have discretion on whether to proceed with a
claim.100
The AKS is important to ensure that patient services or treatments
are only provided when medically necessary and not as a result of a
hidden kickback or remuneration that a physician or service provider
will receive in exchange for the patient referral.101 Overutilization of
services and exposure of patients to unnecessary medical care for pe-
cuniary gain creates potential danger to the patient, as well as consti-
tutes fraud against the federal government.102 Additionally, when
these types of illegal arrangements exist between parties, successful
competition from new businesses will be hindered.103 A robust com-
petitive market in health care would provide better quality for a better
value as businesses compete for clients.104 Therefore, this lack of com-
96. Catherine A. Martin et al., Federal Antikickback Statute, in HEALTH LAW
HANDBOOK § 4.3 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed. 2013); Catherine A. Martin et al., CMPs:
New Exceptions to What Constitutes “Remuneration,” in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK
§ 4.6 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed. 2013).
97. While criminal sanctions, civil money penalties, and exclusion are often availa-
ble for the same conduct, the focus of the sanctions is different. ALICE G. GOSFIELD,
supra note 94, at § 4:2.
98. Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2018, DEP’T JUSTICE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jus-
tice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018
[https://perma.cc/45WR-TZT5].
99. ALICE G. GOSFIELD, supra note 94, §§ 2:21 & 2:28.
100. Id. § 2:28.
101. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71–72 (3d Cir. 1985).
102. See, e.g., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., Advisory
Op. No. 98-13 (1998) (“In assessing the potential risk of fraud or abuse under the
AKS, our concerns are primarily fourfold: increased risk of overutilization, increased
program costs, patient freedom of choice, and unfair competition.”).
103. See id.
104. Id.
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petition ultimately hurts both the patients and the federal programs,
resulting in less freedom of choice between providers for patients.105
B. The FCA as a Tool to Combat Health Care Fraud
The false-claims statutes have both criminal and civil components.
The purpose of these laws is to prevent the federal government from
paying for a bill when the service was not provided, or it was not pro-
vided per the requirements of the law.106 The FCA imposes civil liabil-
ity on any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented,
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to an officer or
employee of the United States government.107
The federal FCA permits the federal government to recover from a
person who knowingly submits a false claim to the government a pen-
alty ranging from $11,181 to $22,363 for each false claim submitted.108
Additionally, the government may recover three times the amount of
actual damages—known as “treble damages”—realized by the gov-
ernment.109 There are additional administrative monetary penalties as
well as provisions for exclusion from participating in the federal
programs.110
The FCA is unique when compared against the other major health
care federal fraud and abuse laws because it allows for qui tam ac-
tions.111 The FCA qui tam provision is one of the strongest whistle-
blower protection laws in the United States.112 This allows a private
individual to bring a claim against a health care entity or individual if
the relator or “whistleblower” has independent knowledge that the
FCA is being violated.113 The qui tam relator is awarded a percentage
of the damages won against the defendant.114 This incentivizes the
public to come forward and sue individuals or entities who are de-
frauding the government.115 Historically, most health care fraud
claims were initiated by qui tam actions until the government began
105. Id.
106. “[F]ederal law makes it a felony knowingly and willfully to make or cause to
be made a false claim or statement under any health benefit program which receives
federal funding . . . or a state health program, including Medicaid.” GOSFIELD, supra
note 94, at § 5:1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(a) (2012)).
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
108. Id. § 3729(a). The most recent increases in penalties were published in 83 Fed.
Reg. 3944, 3945 (Jan. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 85).
109. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1)–(3), (b)(1)–(15) (2012); Id. § 1320a-7(a)(1)–(3),
(b)(1)–(15); see also GOSFIELD, supra note 94, at § 5:1.
111. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
112. False Claims Act/Qui Tam FAQ, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., https://www
.whistleblowers.org/faq/false-claims-act-qui-tam/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) [https://per
ma.cc/SPM7-JAG3].
113. Id.
114. United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1323, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (whistleblower was awarded over $20 million).
115. NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., supra note 112.
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allocating more resources to investigate and bring claims indepen-
dently.116 The FCA is still an essential law used today to deter health
care fraud and recover billions of dollars for the government.
The theory of a false claim allegation may rest on a factually false
claim or a legally false claim. Traditionally, the FCA was used to pe-
nalize providers who sent a bill to Medicare for goods or services that
were never provided.117 This would be an example of a factually false
claim. In addition, behaviors such as upcoding, providing services that
are not medically necessary, unbundling, and mischaracterizing a pa-
tient’s Diagnosis Related Group to recoup a greater reimbursement
are other examples of factually false claims.118
In addition to claims that are factually false, a person may be liable
under the FCA for submitting a claim to the government that is a
legally false claim.119 The person who submits the bill, or causes the
bill to be submitted, must certify that she is aware of the rules and
regulations pertaining to the Medicare or Medicaid program and that
the organization is in compliance with those rules.120 If the bill submit-
ted to the government for payment was for services actually rendered
(and necessary), but the provider received a kickback in connection
with the service, then this would be a tainted bill. The person who
116. See, e.g., United States v. Cathedral Rock Corp., No. 4:03CV1090 HEA, 2007
WL 4270784, at *1–3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2007); see also Carolyn J. Paschke, The Qui
Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The Statute in Current Form, Its His-
tory and Its Unique Position to Influence the Health Care Industry, 9 J.L. & HEALTH
163–65, 177 (1994). Cf. Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Press Release 18-1690,
Justice Department Recovers $2.8 Billion from False Claim Act Cases in Fiscal Year
2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/GF2E-
DAWF]; Marc. S. Raspanti & Sara R. Lavelle, Who is Enforcing the Stark Law of the
United States?, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Sept. 2012, at 24, 26.
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012); see also GOSFIELD, supra note 94, at § 5:1.
118. Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Im-
plied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
227, 239 (2013).
119. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (2016)
(holding that “[t]he implied false certification theory can be a basis for FCA liability
when a defendant submitting a claim makes specific representations about the goods
or services provided, but fails to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regu-
latory, or contractual requirements . . .”).
120. An example of this certification is found in United States ex rel. Kester v.
Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.:
I agree to abide by the Social Security Act and all applicable Medicare laws,
regulations and program instructions that apply to this supplier. The Medi-
care laws, regulations, and program instructions are available through the
Medicare contractor. I understand that payment of a claim by Medicare is
conditioned upon the claim and the underlying transaction complying with
such laws, regulations, and program instructions (including, but not limited
to, the Federal anti-kickback statute and the Stark law), and on the sup-
plier’s compliance with all applicable conditions of participation in
Medicare.
United States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 242, 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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submitted this tainted bill would be liable under the FCA, in addition
to any liability under the AKS.121 The same argument can be made
with a bill that is tainted because of an inappropriate physician refer-
ral under the Stark law.
C. The Stark Law as a Tool to Combat Health Care Fraud
Congress further strengthened the government’s ability to combat
fraud by creating the Physician Self-Referral law.122 Concerned with
the fact that physicians who had an ownership interest in an entity
would disproportionately refer their patients for procedures or diag-
nostics compared with physicians who did not have an ownership in-
terest, Congress sought to curtail this problem of unnecessary
provision of medical services.123 In 1988, Congress put a provision of
what would eventually become part of Stark law into the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988.124 While repealed in 1989, this
prevented a physician from referring a patient for infusion therapy if
the physician had a financial relationship with the infusion facility.125
Subsequently, Congressman Pete Stark became concerned with the
growing problem that physicians were valuing their own financial in-
terests over appropriate treatment for their patients.126 With the help
of his efforts, the present day Stark law came into existence through
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989.127
Today, this is referred to as Stark I, and it very narrowly regulates
physician referrals.128 Effective as of January 1, 1992, Stark I prohibits
a physician from referring patients for clinical laboratory testing if the
physician either invested in the laboratory or had a compensation ar-
rangement with the entity.129 The next year, the modern-day Stark law
was born. As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Stark II prohibits referrals not only to tainted clinical laboratory ser-
vices but also to a detailed list of designated health services
(“DHS”).130 It was not until August 14, 1995, eight months after Stark
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012).
122. Lynn Gordon, Payors Acquiring Physician Practices: Purchase Price Limita-
tions and Other Stark & Anti-Kickback Rules of the Road, HEALTH L., Apr. 2014, at
24, 25; see also Bailey Wendzel et al., Healthcare Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1033,
1068 (2019).
123. Gordon, supra note 122, at 25.
124. MATYAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 131.
125. Id.
126. Matt Frederiksen & Emily Egan Weaver, Understanding the Federal Physician
Self-Referral Statute: “Stark Law” Statute May Be Difficult to Understand, but Compli-
ance Officers Must Have at Least a Basic Understanding, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLI-
ANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2015, at 47, 48.
127. MATYAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 131.
128. STARK LAW, http://starklaw.org/stark_law.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/F5FF-VG3L].
129. MATYAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 133.
130. Id. at 134.
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II went into effect, that final regulations on interpreting Stark I were
released.131 CMS did explain, however, that these regulations would
guide how all DHS referrals would be viewed and thus provided lim-
ited guidance to physicians on how to adapt to the new changes.132
Stark II regulations were not finalized until September 2007.133
In the early 2000s, Congress sought to crack down on physician
ownership interests in specialty hospitals.134 After a moratorium
lapsed on prohibiting physicians from owning cardiac-care centers, or-
thopedic centers, and other surgical facilities, Congress was able to
incorporate its failed objectives into the ACA.135 Now, unless the hos-
pital existed or was planned prior to December 31, 2010, physician
equity in hospitals is restricted under Stark.136 Notably, ACA and the
subsequent Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
also established a self-referral disclosure protocol (“SRDP”).137 This
allows an entity that finds itself in violation of Stark to self-report to
CMS or OIG if other laws have been violated and to face lower penal-
ties than had the violation been found externally by the
government.138
The Stark law can be essentially broken down as follows: a physi-
cian cannot make a referral for a DHS that is payable by Medicaid or
Medicare to an entity in which the physician has a financial relation-
ship, unless an exception applies.139 A Stark violation only occurs if
the entire definition is satisfied, and it is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine whether a violation occurred.140 Thus, it is important to under-
stand each element of the rule to assess as accurately as possible
whether an arrangement is prohibited.
A physician includes a medical or osteopathic doctor, podiatrist, op-
tometrist, or a doctor of dental surgery or medicine.141 A referral is a
physician request for a service or item.142 If the physician personally
performs the service, then Stark is not implicated.143 DHSs include:
clinical laboratory services; physical therapy services; occupational
131. Id.; BRADFORD E. ADATTO ET AL., REPRESENTING PHYSICIANS HANDBOOK
97 (4th ed. 2016).
132. MATYAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 135.
133. Id. at 137 & n.32 (citing 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012 (Sept. 5, 2007) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts 411, 424)).
134. Id. at 134–36.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 206.
138. Id.; see also Daniel R. Levinson, Office Inspector Gen., An Open Letter to
Healthcare Providers (Mar. 24, 2009), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/Open
Letter3-24-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGT7-W4FV].
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); Frederiksen & Weaver supra note 126, at
47–48.
140. Frederiksen & Weaver supra note 126, at 48.
141. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2017).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5)(A) (2012).
143. Id. § 1395nn(b)(1).
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therapy services; radiology services; radiation therapy services and
supplies; durable medical equipment and supplies; parenteral and en-
teral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; prosthetics, orthotics, and
prosthetic devices and supplies; home health services; outpatient pre-
scription drugs; inpatient and outpatient hospital services; and outpa-
tient speech-language pathology services.144 The entity is the business
that performs the DHS or submits the claim to Medicare.145
A financial relationship constitutes either a direct or indirect invest-
ment interest, or a direct or indirect compensation arrangement with
the entity.146 Further, the physician does not need to be the one with
the financial relationship; instead, a physician’s immediate family
member, including spouses, children, step-family, in-laws, grandpar-
ents and grandchildren themselves and their spouses, could trigger a
Stark violation.147 Various exceptions to the law exist; however, unless
the referral arrangement fits squarely within the statute, a violation
occurs.
Stark law is a solely civil statute, but Stark II expanded the law’s
reach by making a physician strictly liable for a violation.148 As such,
the physician does not need to be aware of or intend to enter into an
inappropriate referral arrangement for a violation to occur. Instead,
even if a physician refers a patient for a service and the patient inad-
vertently goes to a facility which has a financial relationship with the
prescribing physician, a violation may occur unless an exception ap-
plies.149 A violation can result in any or a combination of the follow-
ing consequences: denial of payment, mandated return of payments
received, civil monetary penalties up to $15,000 per service provided,
and exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid.150 Additionally, civil
monetary penalties of up to $100,000 can be imposed for each scheme
in which the physician was involved. However, civil monetary penal-
ties or exclusion would only be imposed if the physician knowingly
committed a violation.151 Physicians act knowingly when they either
knew or should have known that the claim was fraudulent.152
As mentioned above, CMS primarily regulates Stark compliance;
however, claims for violations are usually filed as qui tam suits under
the FCA.153 When providers submit a claim to Medicare for reim-
144. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6).
145. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2).
147. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(e); Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, The Stark Laws: Con-
quering Physician Conflicts of Interest?, 87 GEO. L.J. 499, 500 (1998).
149. See Klein, supra note 148, at 515.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1)–(3).
151. Id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
152. Id. § 1320a–7a(a)(1)(B).
153. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2012); Sean Hanssler, “Stark” Raving Mad: Making
the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Better, Faster, Stronger, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV.
951, 951 (2017).
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bursement, they are certifying that they are in compliance with federal
law.154 Thus, if a physician violates Stark, he or she also violates the
FCA once the claim is submitted to Medicare or Medicaid. FCA viola-
tions can be penalized from $5,000 to $10,000 per claim in addition to
treble damages.155 Under the FCA, a relator brings a qui tam suit
against the party that is allegedly in violation.156 From there, the DOJ
decides whether to intervene in the case or, if not, the relator contin-
ues with a private suit.157 The number of qui tam suits is on the rise
and the law’s broad scope implicates even justified business
arrangements.158
D. MACRA Reform Highlights the Need for Value-Based Care
An important piece helpful in understanding the urgency to reform
the Stark law is a newly implemented law that transformed the Medi-
care payment process for physicians. The Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) is bipartisan legislation
signed into law on April 16, 2015.159 Implementation began in January
of 2017, but the law was not fully implemented until 2019.160 MACRA
was passed with the support of more than 750 physician membership
organizations—who supported the new payment models outlined in
this law.161 The goal of this legislation is to change the way that Medi-
care rewards clinicians for volume over value. In order to accomplish
the goal and transition to reward value over volume, CMS created the
Merit Based Incentive Payments System (“MIPS”). Moreover,
MACRA also provides economic incentives for participation in eligi-
ble Alternative Payment Models (“APM”) as part of the new Quality
Payment Program (“QPP”).162 The bill passed overwhelmingly in
154. Hanssler, supra note 153, at 958.
155. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
156. Hanssler, supra note 153, at 951.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 976; Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 15, 45 (2011).
159. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10,
129 Stat. 87 (2015).
160. Quality Payment Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568, 53,568 (Nov. 16, 2017) (codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 414).
161. Bob Doherty, SGR Repeal and MACRA: Here’s Why it is Remarkable, KEVIN
MD (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2015/04/sgr-repeal-and-macra-
heres-why-its-remarkable.html [https://perma.cc/ZP2X-CJJK].
162. Quality Payment Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,568, 53,569 (Nov. 16, 2017) (codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 414).
In addition, the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate formula was repealed. See id.
Section 1848(f) of the [Social Security] Act, as amended by section 4503 of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) (Pub. L. 105-33), enacted on Au-
gust 5, 1997, replaced the Medicare Volume Performance Standard (MVPS)
with a Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) provision. Section 1848(f)(2) of the
Act specifies the formula for establishing yearly SGR targets for physicians’
services under Medicare. The use of SGR targets is intended to control the
growth in aggregate Medicare expenditures for physicians’ services.
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Congress, with a 392–37 vote in the House of Representatives163 and a
92–8 vote in the Senate.164
Prior to the QPP, payment increases for Medicare services were set
by the Sustainable Growth Rate (“SGR”) law.165 This capped spend-
ing increases according to the growth in the Medicare population, with
a modest allowance for inflation.166 MACRA repealed the SGR. The
new QPP is a paradigm shift in Medicare payment for services. The
QPP requires physicians to participate in MIPS unless they are other-
wise exempt.167 Additionally, the physician may participate in an eligi-
ble APM.168 Under the MIPS program, the eligible physician will be
measured based on four criteria: quality of service provided, promot-
ing interoperability, improvement activities, and cost of care.169 Each
performance category will be evaluated on an annual basis and re-
ported to CMS. Based on the total score, the physician will receive a
payment adjustment—either a bonus or reduction in reimbursement,
depending on how they scored against these metrics.170 MIPS ties pay-
ments to the improvement in the quality of care while reducing costs
M. KENT CLEMENS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESTIMATED SUS-
TAINABLE GROWTH RATE AND CONVERSION FACTOR, FOR MEDICARE PAYMENTS TO
PHYSICIANS IN 2015 1 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
payment/sustainablegratesconfact/downloads/sgr2015p.pdf [https://perma.cc/42CA-
YUKN].
163. 161 CONG. REC. H2045 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (regarding the consideration
of H.R. 2, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015).
164. 161 CONG. REC. S2161 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2015).
165. Quality Payment Program Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://
qpp.cms.gov/about/qpp-overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JCY4-
ACW8].
166. Id.; see also Lee Squitieri & Kevin C. Chung, Value-Based Payment Reform
and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015: A Primer
for Plastic Surgeons, PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY (July 1, 2018), https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5487279/ [https://perma.cc/D3XJ-TRBN].
167. How MIPs Eligibility is Determined, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://
qpp.cms.gov/mips/how-eligibility-is-determined (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [https://per
ma.cc/8HST-UXEV]. Clinicians must exceed the low-volume threshold in order to be
eligible for MIPS. In addition, “[clinicians] must participate in MIPS (unless otherwise
exempt) if, in both twelve-month segments, [they]: bill more than $90,000 for Part B
covered professional services, see more than 200 Part B patients, and; provide 200 or
more covered professional services to Part B patients.” Id. Additionally, only certain
clinicians are eligible, if the clinician is not one of the enumerated types, then she is
exempt:
Physicians (including doctors of medicine, osteopathy, dental surgery, dental
medicine, podiatric medicine, and optometry), Osteopathic practitioners,
Chiropractors, Physician assistants, Nurse practitioners, Clinical nurse spe-
cialists, Certified registered nurse anesthetists, Physical therapists, Occupa-
tional therapists, Clinical psychologists, Qualified speech-language
pathologists, Qualified audiologists, Registered dietitians or nutrition
professionals.
Id.
168. Quality Payment Program Overview, supra note 165.
169. MIPS Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/
overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PD57-74Z5].
170. Id.
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as well as increasing the electronic exchange of health information
that will promote comprehensive care.171
Physicians may also choose to participate in an eligible APM for
reimbursement. An APM is defined by CMS as “a payment approach
that gives added incentive payments to provide high-quality and cost-
efficient care.”172 Reimbursement under this approach can be applied
to a specific clinical condition, a care episode, or a population.173 Re-
imbursement requires a showing that the quality of care for the pa-
tient is improved and the costs for the payers and patients are
reduced.174 This is intended to move the clinician away from the fee-
for-service reimbursement to a value-based payment mechanism.175
Examples of approved APMs are the ACO176 and the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”).177 CMS and HHS has permitted
171. Id. See also critique of MIPS and the possible effect on rural providers who
are not equipped with infrastructure or resources to support transition to EHR. John
Koncelik, MD, DO, MACRA: A Legal Conundrum for Solo, Rural & Small Practice
Physicians 6–7 (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
172. APMs Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/apms/
overview (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/M4FB-PF64].
173. Id.
174. Id. Also, the Quality Payment Program created an Advanced APM model that
raised the standards for participating clinicians to receive a lump sum annual bonus of
up to 5% of the previous year’s reimbursement for Part B and possible exemption
from MIPS for taking on additional risks for participating in the advanced APMs.
CMS estimates less than 10% of clinicians will participate in the advanced APMs in
the initial years of this program. See Robert F. Atlas, David B. Tatge, & Lesley R.
Yeung, All About APMs: What Will It Take for Physicians to Earn the APM Bonus
Under MACRA?, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN - EBG ADVISORS CLIENT ALERT (June
21, 2016), https://www.ebglaw.com/news/all-about-apms-what-will-it-take-for-physi-
cians-to-earn-the-apm-bonus-under-macra/ [https://perma.cc/X9D4-FCVV].
175. See Quality Payment Program Overview, supra note 165.
176. An example of an approved APM is the ACO:
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are groups of doctors, hospitals,
and other health care providers, who come together voluntarily to give coor-
dinated high-quality care to the Medicare patients they serve. Coordinated
care helps ensure that patients, especially the chronically ill, get the right
care at the right time, with the goal of avoiding unnecessary duplication of
services and preventing medical errors. When an ACO succeeds in both de-
livering high-quality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, it
will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare program.
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs): General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/aco/ (last updated Oct. 31,
2019) [https://perma.cc/6XT9-VQD4].
177. Another approved APM is the Medicare Shared Savings Program:
The Shared Savings Program offers providers and suppliers (e.g., physicians,
hospitals, and others involved in patient care) an opportunity to create an
Accountable Care Organization (ACO). . . .The Shared Savings Program has
different tracks that allow ACOs to select an arrangement that makes the
most sense for their organization.
The Shared Savings Program is an important innovation for moving CMS’
payment system away from volume and toward value and outcomes. It is an
alternative payment model.
Id.
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fairly broad waivers to be used to allow the MSSP and ACOs to form
and operate.178 Without these waivers, these payment models would
violate the Stark law. This approach of allowing waivers has created
uncertainty and fragmentation in relation to whether ACO arrange-
ments implicate the Stark law and, if so, to what extent.179 Health-law
stakeholders have contended the need to eliminate this uncertainty
with an amendment to the Stark law in order to create an exception
for MSSPs, ACOs, and other models established by CMS and tested
under the Innovation Center.180 Undoubtedly, MACRA has added to
the complexity of navigating Stark law as clinicians propose alterna-
tive payment models that are technically in violation of Stark absent a
waiver from CMS. MACRA and the Stark law are in direct conflict,
thus adding to the need to reform the Stark law.181
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE STARK LAW WILL ALLOW
HOSPITALS AND PROVIDERS THE FREEDOM TO CREATE
NEW ARRANGEMENTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
TO SUPPORT VALUE-BASED CARE
As mentioned above, the fee-for-service reimbursement models,
which necessitated laws such as Stark, are quickly becoming obsolete
as the push for value-based reimbursement takes over. Stark has
evolved into an ambiguous and highly complex law that is impeding
the full adoption of new models of care that seek to clinically and
financially integrate providers.182 As Judge James A. Wynn of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in 2015,
“[E]ven for well-intentioned health care providers, the Stark law has
become a booby trap rigged with strict liability and potentially ruinous
178. Letter from Clifton Gaus, CEO of the National Association of ACOs, to Sen-
ate Finance Committee (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.naacos.com/comments-on-effects-
of-stark-law [https://perma.cc/3NS9-TH4Y].
179. Id.
180. Id.; Innovation Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/#views=models (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) [https://per
ma.cc/DR3M-BHV3] (“The CMS Innovation Center develops new payment and ser-
vice delivery models in accordance with the requirements of section 1115A of the
Social Security Act. . . . The Innovation Center also plays a critical role in implement-
ing the Quality Payment Program, which Congress created as part of the Medicare
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) to replace Medicare’s Sus-
tainable Growth Rate formula to pay for physicians’ and other providers’ services
. . . .”).
181. Rebecca Olavarria, MACRA and Stark: Strange Bedfellows at the Heart of
Health Care Reform, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 131, 179–80 (2017).
182. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Statement at Finance
Hearing on the Stark Law (July 12, 2016), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-
news/hatch-statement-at-finance-hearing-on-the-stark-law [https://perma.cc/9RWZ-
L7A5] [hereinafter Senate Finance Committee Press Release]; Jeff Overley, Stark Law
Overhaul Gains Traction on Capitol Hill, LAW360 (July 12, 2016), https://www.law360
.com/articles/815929/stark-law-overhaul-gains-traction-on-capitol-hill [https://perma
.cc/5MDZ-KNLA].
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exposure—especially when coupled with the FCA.”183 The Senate Fi-
nance Committee noted that Stark’s “breadth, complexity, and impen-
etrability have created a minefield for the health care industry.”184 In
addition,
[t]he risk of overutilization, which drove the passage of the Stark
law, is largely or entirely eliminated in alternative payment models.
When physicians earn profit margins not by the volume of services
but by the efficiency of services and treatment outcomes, their eco-
nomic self-interest aligns with the interest to eliminate unnecessary
services.185
Most agree that Stark needs to be reformed in a way to allow these
new coordinated care relationships to form.186 Former Secretaries of
HHS, Kathleen Sebelius and Tommy Thompson, described the Stark
law, along with AKS, as a “remnant of the fee-for-service world [that]
harm the very patients they are supposed to protect by deterring more
comprehensive patient-centered care.”187 Calls to reform Stark law
are not new.188 However, the enactment of MACRA has made the
case for reforming Stark even stronger.189 The Senate Finance Com-
mittee examined the Stark law in 2015, which resulted in the 2016
White Paper, “Why Stark, Why Now? Suggestions to Improve the
Stark Law to Encourage Innovative Payment Models.”190 In the
White Paper, the committee “observed that the Stark Law’s strict lia-
bility standard and significant penalties are viewed by health care
companies as serious obstacles to implementing MACRA and other
alternative payment reforms.”191
183. United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 395 (4th Cir. 2015)
(Wynn, J., concurring).
184. SEN. ORRIN HATCH, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., WHY STARK, WHY NOW?
SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE STARK LAW TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATIVE PAYMENT
MODELS 1 (2016), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stark%20White
%20Paper,%20SFC%20Majority%20Staff.pdf [https://perma.cc/72H5-USMT].
185. See Senate Finance Committee Press Release, supra note 182; see also Overley,
supra note 182.
186. See Medicare Program; Request for Information Regarding the Physician Self-
Referral Law, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,524 (June 25, 2018).
187. Amy H. Kearbey & Amandeep S. Sidhu, INSIGHT: Stark Law Reform Could
Shift the Dynamics—And Maybe Even the Burden of Proof—in Future FCA Cases,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018, 9:07 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
health-law-and-business/insight-stark-law-reform-could-shift-the-dynamicsand-may
be-even-the-burden-of-proofin-future-fca-cases [https://perma.cc/6HLC-TTDZ].
188. See, e.g., Kathy H. Butler, Stark Law Reform: Is It Time?, 18 J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 5 (2016); Nicholas J. Diamond, Giving Disclosure Its Due: A Proposal
for Reforming the Stark Law, 16 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 1 (2014); Christian
D. Humphreys, Regulation of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Is Prohibition the
Answer or Has Congress Operated on the Wrong Patient?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161
(1993).
189. HATCH, supra note 184, at 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 19; Kearbey & Sidhu, supra note 187.
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Despite the call for change by the Senate Finance Committee,
meaningful change has yet to be adopted. There is sharp disagreement
about which way to move forward with reform. Some health-law com-
mentators have argued for the complete repeal of Stark.192 Their posi-
tion is that Stark and its numerous and detailed exceptions have made
compliance nearly impossible.193 Even Congressman Fortney “Pete”
Stark, who is the namesake of the Stark law, lamented that the law is
now filled with “complications . . . added by high-priced lawyers who
tried to build loopholes for their clients.”194 Congressman Stark said
he would be in favor of repealing the law as it currently exists.195 Dur-
ing the Senate Finance Committee meeting in July of 2016, Dr. Ron-
ald Paulus, MD, CEO of Mission Health based in Asheville, North
Carolina, remarked that problems with the Stark law cannot be fixed
by tinkering around the edges, but a full repeal is necessary to allow
for the appropriate business relationships to form and move forward
with population health efforts.196
As momentum was growing for Stark reform, Congress considered
this law and the problems it was creating in achieving health care pay-
ment reform. During the 2017–2018 legislative session, a bill was in-
troduced in both the House and the Senate, titled “Medicare Care
Coordination Improvement Act of 2017.”197 This bill was referred to
committee for consideration to “amend Title XVIII of the Social Se-
curity Act to modernize the physician self-referral prohibitions[,] to
promote care coordination in the merit-based incentive payment sys-
tem[,] and to facilitate physician-practice participation in alternative
payment models under the Medicare program . . . .”198 However, no
192. Olavarria, supra note 181, at 179–81
193. Susan O. Scheutzow, Challenges to Employed Physicians’ Compensation: Di-
rect, Indirect, or Unintelligible Compensation, 7 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb. 2014,
at 1, 5 (applying this analysis to physicians hired by hospitals or hospital subsidiaries
can be extremely technical and confusing); Claire Turcotte, Keeping Clients Compli-
ant with Stark and Other Health Care Laws, HEALTH CARE L. ENFORCEMENT & COM-
PLIANCE, Sept. 2011, at *2, 2011 WL 4454656.
194. Joe Carlson, Peter Stark: Repeal the Stark Law, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 2,
2013, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130802/BLOG/3080299
95/pete-stark-repeal-the-stark-law [https://perma.cc/VS98-LJFN].
195. Id.
196. Id.; Examining the Stark Law: Current Issues and Opportunities: Hearing
Before U.S. Senate Fin. Comm., 114th Cong. (July 12, 2016), https://www.finance.sen
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/26440.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM36-S3A5].
197. Medicare Care Coordination Improvement Act of 2017, S. 2051, 115th Cong.
(2017). The House of Representatives also introduced a coordinating bill. H.R. 4206,
115th Cong. (2017).
198. H.R. 4206, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4206 – Medicare Care Coordination Im-
provement Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/4206 (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B82U-HKW6] (referred to
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, House Energy and Commerce Sub-
committee on Health, and House Ways and Means Committee).
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further action was taken during this legislative session other than the
referral to various committees.199
A. Finding a Path to Comprehensive Stark Reform
Some health-law commentators have argued for the elimination of
Stark altogether, proffering that the AKS and the FCA achieve the
necessary protection for the integrity of the health care programs.200
However, others argue for removal of only the physician-compensa-
tion arm of Stark, while leaving the ownership and investment
prohibitions intact.201 One argument for removing the physician-com-
pensation arm of Stark is that Stark was meant to provide a bright-line
rule to prohibit a physician from referring a patient for a service in
order to make a greater profit.202 Nevertheless, due to the fact-inten-
sive nature of proving terms such as “fair-market value,” “takes into
account the volume or value of referrals,” and “commercially reasona-
ble,” which are present in the physician compensation exceptions, the
result is anything but a bright-line test.203 In this sense, some health-
law commentators argue that, due to the courts’ varied interpretations
of these terms and the fact-intensive nature of proving them in litiga-
tion, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to win on a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment.204 As a result, defendants are exposed
to costly litigation in order to dispose of a frivolous claim brought by a
relator.205 Repealing the physician compensation arrangement arm of
199. H.R. 4206 – Medicare Care Coordination Improvement Act of 2017, supra note
198.
200. Letter from Philip Wheeler, Mercy Health, to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (August 23, 2018) (on file
in the regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-
2018-0082-0210 [https://perma.cc/798S-M8NA]).
201. Olivarria, supra note 181, at 179–80. As mentioned above, Stark has two arms.
One arm prohibits relationships of ownership and investment in the DHS entity and
exceptions exist for this arm. The second arm prohibits compensation received from
the DHS entity and exceptions exist for this arm as well. Some exceptions apply to
both ownership and compensation models. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); see also
Olavarria, supra note 181, at 148–52.
202. See Olavarria, supra note 181, at 179–180 (citing Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark
Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 16–18 (2011)).
203. See id.
204. “Ultimately, fair market value is determined based on facts and circumstances.
The appropriate method will depend on the nature of the transaction, its location, and
other factors.” Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With
Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012, 51,015–16
(Sept. 5, 2007) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts 411 & 424).
205. Kearbey & Sidhu, supra note 187 (“For example, in United States ex rel. Bing-
ham v. BayCare Health Systems (M.D. Fla., No. 8:14-cv-73), the defendant hospital
was unable to dispense with an FCA complaint based on a questionable Stark theory
and very loose facts. While the hospital ultimately prevailed on summary judgment, it
was forced to endure another year and a half of time-consuming and costly discovery
and motion practice to defeat a relator who apparently had no evidence to support his
claims.”).
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Stark, along with these nebulous terms at the heart of each exception,
could eliminate the need to debate the meaning of these terms that
have varying interpretations depending on the jurisdiction.
Additionally, some commentators argue that the primary risk of
overutilization of services is not an issue with the implementation of
value-based payment models.206 The value-based payment models re-
ward efficiency and improved patient care and do not financially re-
ward an increase in volume of services.207 Therefore, there is lower
risk that a physician will refer patients for unnecessary services.208
In light of the data supporting a transition to alternative payment
models,209 and of the lessened risk of abuse with these new models,
HHS sought public comment through a Request for Information
(“RFI”) regarding the best way to reform Stark and allow new pay-
ment systems to be fully adopted in health care.
B. CMS Issues a Request for Information on June 25, 2018
On June 25, 2018, in response to the Trump Administration’s push
to simplify administrative regulations that are impeding health care
delivery,210 HHS, through CMS, issued a RFI seeking comments from
the public on how to reform the Stark law.211 In this request, CMS
explained that HHS “is working to transform the health[ ]care system
into one that pays for value.”212 CMS explained that removing unnec-
essary government obstacles to care coordination is a key priority for
the agency.213 To accelerate the process and realize this goal of mov-
ing to a value-based payment system, HHS launched a “Regulatory
Sprint to Coordinated Care” focused on identifying requirements or
obstacles that “act as a barrier to coordinated care.”214
CMS explained that some aspects of the Stark law may present a
barrier to coordinated care and to the transition to a value-based pay-
ment system. Therefore, one of CMS’s goals in the “Regulatory Sprint
to Coordinated Care” was to address these barriers created by the
206. See Olavarria, supra note 181, at 180.
207. Douglas A. Conrad, The Theory of Value-Based Payment Incentives and Their
Application to Health Care, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 2057, 2057 (2015).
208. Olavarria, supra note 181, at 180.
209. Id. at 163–64.
210. Medicare Program; Request for Information Regarding the Physician Self-Re-
ferral Law, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,524, 29,524 (June 25, 2018).
211. Id. The OIG for HHS similarly published an RFI for input on how it might
add or amend safe harbors to the AKS statute. Although relevant to the regulatory
landscape for the healthcare industry, AKS potential for reform is outside the scope
of this Article. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Request
for Information Regarding the Anti-Kickback Statute and Beneficiary Inducements
CMP, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,607 (Aug. 27, 2018).
212. Medicare Program; Request for Information Regarding the Physician Self-Re-
ferral Law, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,524, 29,524 (June 25, 2018).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Stark law. CMS posed twenty specific requests for information regard-
ing the Stark law.215 CMS asked for comment regarding concerns of
the applicability of existing Stark exceptions, the ability to enter into
commercial alternative payment models, and the ability to enter into
novel financial relationships.216 CMS sought comment on whether any
additional exceptions would be necessary to protect entities and indi-
viduals participating in these alternative payment models.217 The RFI
also sought feedback regarding the specific language in the current
law, including “fair-market value,” “commercial reasonableness,” and
“takes into account the volume or value of referrals.”218 Finally, CMS
requested information as to the positive and negative effects the Stark
law had on the health care industry.219 The RFI was so far-ranging
that CMS effectively invited comments on every aspect of Stark law
that a stakeholder believed warranted revision or clarification.220
CMS received hundreds of replies in respect to the RFI.221 Re-
sponses were received from major organizations such as the American
Bar Association (“ABA”), the American Hospital Association
(“AHA”), American Medical Association (“AMA”), universities,
medical device manufacturers, and major health systems, as well as
from individual providers and patients.222
215. Id. at 29,525–26 (Part III).
216. Id. at 29,525.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 29,526.
219. Id. Additional points for comment in the RFI included barriers to the “group
practice” definition, the utility of the risk sharing and personal services arrangements
exceptions, the cost of compliance with Stark, and whether CMS should measure the
effectiveness of Stark Law in preventing unnecessary utilization and other forms of
program abuse relative to the cost burden on the regulated industry. Id.
220. Eric B. Gordon, MD. et al., CMS Seeks Comment on Stark Law Reforms
Needed to Reduce Obstacles to Innovation, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (June 26,
2018), https://www.mwe.com/insights/cms-seeks-comments-on-stark-law-reforms/
[https://perma.cc/PA27-39DB].
221. See Medicare Program; Physician Self-Referral Rulemaking Documents, REGU-
LATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=
postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=CMS-2018-0082 (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/M5C2-QDHP].
222. See, e.g., Letter from Simeon Carson, Director, ABA Health L. Sec., to Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., (Dec. 30 2019) (on file at https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0612) [https://perma.cc/5XBC-5YZK]; Letter
from James L. Madara, Exec. V.P. & CEO, Am. Med. Ass’n, to Seema Verma,
Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Aug.
24, 2018) (on file in the regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0550 [https://perma.cc/XCL8-E7HB]).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 29 14-APR-20 15:32
2020] A VITAL FUTURE OF VALUE-BASED CARE 601
C. The Public Responds to CMS’s Request for Information
1. A Call to Amend the Definitions of Key Terms
to Provide Clarity
Common themes emerged in the hundreds of responses to the RFI.
One common response called for clarification with regard to the terms
“fair market value,” “taking into account the volume or value of refer-
rals,” and “commercial reasonableness.”223 Most of the self-referral
compensation exceptions include these terms. However, due to the
ambiguity as to the interpretation of these terms by different courts,
health care entities spent many resources trying to establish compli-
ance with these terms. The AMA, the AHA, and many other re-
sponses—which incorporate AMA’s and AHA’s responses into their
own response—called for a return to the “fair market value” defini-
tion that was adopted in the original rulemaking in 1995.224 This shift
223. Letter from Alexandria Hien McCombs, ABA Health L. Sec. Chair, to Ctrs.
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t Health & Human Servs. 4 (Sept. 26, 2018) (on
file in the regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/docu-
ment?D=CMS-2018-0082-0393 [https://perma.cc/C2JH-EZ7P]); Letter from Thomas
M. Priselac, Pres. & CEO Cedars-Sinai, to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (July
23, 2018) (on file in the regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0038 [https://perma.cc/Y8MY-DNLD]); Letter from
Peter B. Mancino, Deputy Gen. Counsel Johns Hopkins, to The Honorable Seema
Verma 3–4 (Aug. 20, 2018) (on file in the regulations docket browser at https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0380 [https://perma.cc/FG2U-
ABYB]); Letter from The Health Care Transformation Task Force, to Ctrs. for Medi-
care & Medicaid Servs, Dep’t Health & Human Servs. 3 (Dec. 31, 2019) (on file in the
regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-
0082-0677 [https://perma.cc/2NMM-QMNV]); Letter from Philip Wheeler, supra note
200; Letter from Janis M. Orlowski, Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., to The Honorable
Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file
at regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-
2018-0082-0292 [https://perma.cc/A8MD-AAEJ]).
224. Letter from Am. Hosp. Ass’n to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Re: CMS-1720-NC, Request for Information Regarding the Physi-
cian Self-Referral Law, 10, 18–19 (Aug. 3, 2018) (on file in the regulations docket
browser at https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-08/180803-letter-stark-rfi.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/J5SE-HV6J]) [hereinafter Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter]. The codified revi-
sion to the definition of “Fair Market Value” reads:
Fair market value means the value in arm’s-length transactions, consistent
with the general market value. “General market value” means the price that
an asset would bring as the result of bona fide bargaining between well-in-
formed buyers and sellers, or the compensation that would be included in a
service agreement as the result of bona fide bargaining between well-in-
formed parties to the agreement, on the date of acquisition of the asset or at
the time of the service agreement. Usually, the fair market price is the price
at which bona fide sales have been consummated for assets of like type,
quality, and quantity in a particular market at the time of acquisition, or the
compensation that has been included in bona fide service agreements with
comparable terms at the time of the agreement. With respect to rentals and
leases described in § 411.357(a), (b), and (l) (as to equipment leases only),
“fair market value” means the value of rental property for general commer-
cial purposes (not taking into account its intended use). In the case of a lease
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would eliminate the confusion caused by the 2001 change that con-
flated the determination of “fair market value” with whether the pay-
ment took into account the “volume or value of referrals.”225 These
two terms were intended to be distinct determinations.226
A second change urged by the AHA and the AMA was to allow for
a rebuttable presumption of “fair market value” if the hospital or
health system has received a valuation from a qualified valuator prior
to entering into the arrangement.227 This proposed modification
would shift the burden of proof onto the person challenging the valid-
ity of the “fair market value” of compensation.228 It would also pro-
vide increased stability to business arrangements that have followed
the process to receive an independent evaluation by a qualified
evaluator.229
Furthermore, Johns Hopkins Health System advanced the argu-
ment that the “current lack of clarity” for these terms “introduces bus-
iness uncertainty and has a chilling effect on legitimate
arrangements.”230 Stakeholders argue that the “fair market value” test
and the “takes into account the volume or value of referrals” test do
not adequately protect “hospitals under arrangements to appropri-
ately align physician behavior with hospital cost reduction and out-
come improvement goals.”231
of space, this value may not be adjusted to reflect the additional value the
prospective lessee or lessor would attribute to the proximity or convenience
to the lessor when the lessor is a potential source of patient referrals to the
lessee. For purposes of this definition, a rental payment does not take into
account intended use if it takes into account costs incurred by the lessor in
developing or upgrading the property or maintaining the property or its
improvements.
42 C.F.R. § 411.351; see also Letter from James L. Madara, supra note 222, at 15.
225. Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which
They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054-01 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physi-
cians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relation-
ships, 66 Fed. Reg. 855, 856-01 (Jan. 4, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424);
see also Letter from James L. Madara, supra note 222.
226. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 10.
227. Id. at 10. The AHA’s proposed addition, 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(d)(5), reads:
Compensation will be presumed to be “fair market value” where the DHS
entity has obtained a valuation of fair market value from a person or entity
that has certified to the DHS entity their qualifications and training to pro-
vide such an opinion and their independence from the DHS entity. Where
appropriate, the valuation may address and protect the methodology used to
determine the compensation. The burden of proof in such circumstances will
be on the person challenging such valuation.
Id. at 19.
228. Id.
229. ROBERT JOHN KRANE & LAWRENCE E. SINGER, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRAC-
TICE IN ILLINOIS § 26:35 (2019).
230. Letter from Peter B. Mancino, supra note 223, at 4.
231. Letter from R. Brent Rawlings, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Va.
Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n, to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t Health &
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The AHA also advocated for clarity and stated that the phrase
“takes into account the volume or value of referrals” is a bright-line,
objective test that does not look to the state of mind of the parties
entering into the arrangement.232 Additionally, they recommend the
regulations confirm that a “fixed payment per service is deemed not to
vary or take into account the volume or value of referrals as along as
the amount is determined initially by a methodology that does not
take into account referrals and is not subsequently adjusted during the
term based on referrals.”233 AHA proposed that the regulations
should “clarify and reaffirm that the volume/value prohibition is not
implicated where the payment is based on a physician’s personally
performed services notwithstanding a correlation with services being
performed at a hospital.”234 AHA argues that this is especially impor-
tant in light of the innovative payment arrangements and quality im-
provement and care redesign efforts related to clinical integration
initiatives.235
As mentioned above, ambiguity also exists as to whether an ar-
rangement is “commercially reasonable.”236 Once again, these key
terms have been conflated during their interpretation by courts.237
“Commercial reasonableness” analysis has been conflated with “fair
market value for compensation,” causing confusion. AHA requested
clarity on the fact that “commercial reasonableness” does not relate to
the compensation paid by the parties, but instead focuses solely on the
“need for and the utility of the items or services purchased.”238 Pro-
Human Servs. 2 (Aug. 21, 2018) (on file in regulations docket browser at https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0166 [https://perma.cc/8B24-4WFC]).
232. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 10.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 11. For example, the AHA urged for the addition of a provision to the
Code of Federal Regulations:
Definition of When Compensation Does Not Vary With or Otherwise Take
Into Account the Volume or Value of Referrals [Proposed] New Language
42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (d)(5):
Except as provided in subparagraph (c)(2)(ii), compensation shall be
deemed not to be “determined in a manner that takes into account the vol-
ume or value of referrals” if, by the plain terms of the arrangement, the
amount of compensation does not increase or decrease according to in-
creased or decreased value or volume of referrals, respectively during the
term of the arrangement. Except as provided in subparagraph (c)(2)(ii),
compensation based on personally performed relative value units shall be
deemed not to take into account the volume or value of referrals solely be-
cause the physician’s professional service is related to or correlates with the
physician’s DHS referrals, as in the case of surgeries performed in a hospital
or evaluation and management services performed in a provider-based
clinic.
Id.
235. Id. at 11.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 10–11.
238. Id. AHA’s proposed clarification read:
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viding clarity on these three terms will allow entities and physicians
additional freedom to enter into arrangements without fear of the un-
certainty in interpreting these terms.
2. A Call to Reform the Guidance Process Under the Stark Law
Another common theme emerged from responses to the RFI was
the need for effective guidance from CMS. One critique of Stark is
that the current Advisory Opinion process is inadequate. There is
scant information available to help provide guidance on Stark compli-
ance in the ever-changing health care arena.239 Compared with the
AKS that has over 200 Advisory Opinions issued, only fifteen Advi-
sory Opinions have been issued in the last twenty years that are re-
lated to compensation issues under Stark.240 The AHA, in its response
to the RFI, urged CMS to provide “clear, authoritative, and timely
guidance.”241
Another suggested change by the AHA was to accept questions of
general interpretation and hypotheticals through the Advisory Opin-
ion process.242 Currently, these types of questions are not accepted.
The admission of questions and hypotheticals of this kind would be
very useful for providers and entities—that are in anticipation to enter
into arrangements and in need of clarity—to help ensure they are in
compliance.243 AHA argues that substantial resources are being di-
verted away from patient care because they are being spent on navi-
gating the complexity of the Stark law, along with its legal and
compliance requirements.244 This is particularly troublesome for rural
or small providers who do not have the resources for high legal and
compliance fees.245 Clear and timely guidance from CMS could help
eliminate some of these fees.
In addition to reforming the Advisory Opinion process, others have
called for a more developed “Frequently Asked Questions” guidance
for commonly recurring provider circumstances.246 For example, the
Definition of Commercial Reasonableness [Proposed] New Language 42
C.F.R. § 411.351: Commercial reasonableness shall mean that the services or
items purchased or contracted for are of use in the business of the purchas-
ing or contracting party and are of the amount, kind and type of items or
services purchased or contracted for by similarly situated entities.
Id. at 19; see also Letter from James L. Madara, supra note 222, at 1.
239. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 12.
240. Id.; see Advisory Opinions (AOs), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/advisory_
opinions.html (last updated Oct, 22, 2019 10:12 AM) [https://perma.cc/H9G9-8VCE].
241. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 2.




246. Letter from The Health Care Transformation Task Force to Seema Verma,
Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 2–3 (August 24, 2018) (on file in regula-
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Health Care Transformation Task Force (“HCTTF”) noted that there
is limited commentary on the waiver applicability for APM partici-
pants.247 HCTTF urged CMS and OIG to explore mechanisms for
providers to ask questions for guidance about these waivers short of
an Advisory Opinion. HCTTF argued that when “regulated entities
have abundant sub-regulatory guidance on their legal compliance re-
quirements under Stark, entities will have a better understanding of
what activities are and are not permitted.”248
3. A Call to Amend Rules Regarding Technical Noncompliance
with the Stark Law
Another common critique that emerged from the RFI was that
Stark is riddled with numerous complex and technical requirements
that could result in minor and inadvertent noncompliance accompa-
nied with ruinous penalties.249 Mercy Health argued for the expanded
ability to correct Stark law violations because of this issue. Specifi-
cally, Mercy Health argued that health systems spend a significant
amount of time and financial resources to comply with Stark, but even
a minor technical omission, that does not otherwise involve overu-
tilization of services or harm to patients, is a violation of this strict
liability statute.250
An example of this type of technical compliance can be found in the
writing requirements at the inception of a business arrangement aim-
ing to fall within a compensation exception.251 The AHA argues that
the documentation requirements do not add any additional substan-
tive protection against overutilization of services, but instead, can re-
sult in “catastrophic payment denials for clerical errors even when an
arrangement satisfies the substantive elements of an exception.”252
The AHA advocates for a different approach instead of the signature
and writing requirements currently found in many of the compensa-
tion exceptions.253 In this regard, the hospital “should be deemed to
satisfy the writing requirement and signature requirements” if it can
demonstrate “the existence of a binding, enforceable contract under
state law.”254 The AHA states that this will not increase problematic
arrangements, since the substantive elements of the exception will be




249. Letter from Philip Wheeler, supra note 200.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(x).
252. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 12.
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id.
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intact, and it will prevent the disallowance of payments based on
paperwork mistakes.255
4. A Call to Add a New Value-Based Exception to the Stark Law
Although many suggestions emerged from the RFI, one key sugges-
tion that was mirrored by countless stakeholders was the need for a
new value-based payment exception.256 Supporters of this new excep-
tion argued that “the health care system will plateau in its progress
towards value-based care models without the reform and moderniza-
tion of the existing fraud and abuse laws.”257 The AHA advocated for
an exception dedicated to value-based arrangements that could pro-
vide certainty and allow hospitals, physicians, and health systems to
join forces in achieving a patient-centered approach.258 They argue
that:
The new exception should cover only those arrangements with a de-
clared objective of achieving one or more of the pillars of coordi-
nated care: promoting accountability for the quality, cost, and
overall care for patients; managing care for patients across and
among other providers; and, encouraging investment in infrastruc-
ture and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient
care delivery for patients.”259
Additionally, the AHA urges a broad definition of “remuneration”
that includes “incentive payments, shared savings payments based on
actual cost savings, and infrastructure payments or in-kind assistance
(including, but not limited to, electronic health records (EHRs) tech-
nology, cybersecurity resources, data or clinical analysis tools, and
start-up support).”260 The AHA accompanies this suggestion with the
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1–2; Letter from James L. Madara, supra note 222, at 2; Letter from
Peter. B. Mancino, supra note 223, at 2; Letter from Jeffrey R. Balser, Vanderbilt
Univ. Med. Ctr., to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
Dep’t Health & Human Servs. 6, 10 (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file in regulations docket
browser at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0333 [https://
perma.cc/CG9P-JUK7]); Letter from Betsy Van Hecke, Medtronic, to Seema Verma,
Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 4 (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file in regulations
docket browser at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0306
[https://perma.cc/389M-4RJB]); Letter from The Health Care Transformation Task
Force to Seema Verma, supra note 246, at 3; Letter from Anne Adams, Emory Univ.,
to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t Health &
Human Servs. 2 (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file in regulations docket browser at https://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0356 [https://perma.cc/QBP3-JHUJ]);
Letter from R. Brent Rawlings, supra note 231, at 2; Letter from Philip Wheeler to
Seema Verma, supra note 200; Letter from Janis M. Orlowski, Ass’n of Am. Med.
Colls., to The Honorable Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
2, 7 (Aug. 24, 2018) (on file at regulations docket browser at https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0292 [https://perma.cc/A8MD-AAEJ]).
257. Letter from Betsy Van Hecke to Seema Verma, supra note 256, at 2.
258. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 1–4.
259. Id. at 4.
260. Id.
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inclusion of basic accountabilities with the use of these types of incen-
tives. Some suggestions for accountability include transparency in doc-
umentation, recognizable improvement processes that are consistent
with medical standards and improving patient care, and internal moni-
toring of the performance under the new processes to guard against
adverse effects.261
From a policy perspective, health care stakeholders argue this
value-based exception will promote interprofessional relationships be-
cause many different health care providers can work together as a
team to care for the patient. For example, care for a patient in the
community might include a physician, clinical staff, advance practice
nurses, dieticians, and social workers.262 The physician would be re-
sponsible for the overall goals for the patient, but the team would
work together to ensure the success of the plan.263 A team approach
would also provide patients and their families with more readily avail-
able information about their care. Creating a value-based exception
would allow reimbursement for this type of team-based care to reflect
the increased quality of care and improved value to the federal
programs.264
The AHA and AMA, along with many others who replied, stated
that the value-based arrangements would not carry the risk of overu-
tilization that the Stark law was intended to prevent.265 The exception,
they argue, would have protections in place to ensure payment corre-
sponds with both an increase in quality of care to the patient and a
cost-savings to the federal program, therefore removing any incentive
to refer for services not needed by the patient.266 Additionally, the
value-based arrangements would be part of the “existing quality over-
sight programs of the Medicare program, which will guard against
underutilization.”267
261. Id. at 4–5; Letter from Betsy Van Hecke to Seema Verma, supra note 256, at 4.
262. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Defining the PCMH, PATIENT CEN-
TERED MED. HOME RESOURCE CTR., http://pcmh.ahrq.gov/page/defining-pcmh (last
visited Jan. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y7GA-QT5X]; Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter,
supra note 224, at 6.
263. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 6–7.
264. See id. at 2; Letter from Betsy Van Hecke to Seema Verma, supra note 256,
1–4; see also Charles P. Vega & Amy Bernard, Interprofessional Collaboration to Im-
prove Health Care: An Introduction, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.medscape
.org/viewarticle/857823 [https://perma.cc/38TB-7GGF].
265. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 7; Letter from James L.
Madara, supra note 222, at 2.
266. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 7; Letter from James L.
Madara, supra note 222, at 5–6.
267. Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 7. The risk of underutilization
is that the doctor will not refer for additional services to keep the costs down, but then
the patient does not receive necessary care and is harmed by this decision. Mary Du-
Bois Krohn, The False Claims Act and Managed Care: Blowing the Whistle on Un-
derutilization, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 443, 446–47 (1998). Studies have shown this is a
problem especially for minority communities. See Jocelyn T. Chi & Mark S.
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Ultimately, they argue, this exception for value-based care models
is needed to promote widespread adoption of this new delivery model
that will help correct the skyrocketing health care costs while improv-
ing patient outcomes.268
5. Arguments Against Adding a New Value-Based Exception
to the Stark Law
Despite the support from major health care organizations for a new
value-based exception, many individual providers and smaller entities
responded that relaxing the Stark law to allow more exceptions will
lead to more problems for the federal programs. Many argue that a
new value-based exception will keep the referrals within a system
without focusing on what is best for patient care and convenience.269
It is possible to imagine that this type of behavior could lead to a lack
of competition in the market. Moreover, these opponents contend
that relaxing Stark to allow increased coordination of care will drive
out smaller providers.270 A response from a physical-therapy provider
noted that the “MDs have the money to pay lobbyists to influence
these types of decisions . . . [and] benefit . . . by monopolizing the
physical therapy market.”271 Another physical-therapy provider with a
small office commented that an orthopedic group in her region
partnered with a hospital system that obligated the group to keep re-
ferrals to physical therapists within their system.272 She added that the
cost is higher in a hospital system than in private practice, and geo-
Handcock, Identifying Sources of Health Care Underutilization Among California’s
Immigrants, J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 207, 207 (2014); Daphne
Chandler, The Underutilization of Health Services in the Black Community: An Exam-
ination of Causes and Effects, 40 J. BLACK STUD. 915, 915 (2010).
268. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n RFI Letter, supra note 224, at 4.
269. Letter from Francis J. Crosson, MD, Chairman of Medpac, to Seema Verma,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 6 (Dec. 20, 2019), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/
default-source/comment-letters/12202019_selfreferral_medpac_comment_v2_sec.pdf?
sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/UQV4-9GK8].
270. See, e.g., Jodi Blacketer, Comment to Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services
(CMS) Proposed Rule: Medicare Programs: Request for Information Regarding Physi-
cian Self-Referral Law, REGULATIONS.GOV (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0110 [https://perma.cc/4BY7-HM5G]; see also
Pete Bartel, Comment to Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services (CMS) Proposed
Rule: Medicare Programs: Request for Information Regarding Physician Self-Referral
Law, REGULATIONS.GOV (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
CMS-2018-0082-0059 [https://perma.cc/SKJ2-GK97]; Ana Sanchez, Comment to Cen-
ters for Medicare Medicaid Services (CMS) Proposed Rule: Medicare Programs: Re-
quest for Information Regarding Physician Self-Referral Law, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0216
[https://perma.cc/VQU8-6456].
271. Mary Kroth-Brunet, Comment to Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services
(CMS) Proposed Rule: Medicare Programs: Request for Information Regarding Physi-
cian Self-Referral Law, REGULATIONS.GOV (July 12, 2018), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0009 [https://perma.cc/7PQT-ZF48].
272. Blacketer, supra note 270.
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graphical convenience to the patient was never considered.273 She ar-
gued that exceptions to Stark “promote monopolies, limit small
business opportunities, and are not patient centered.”274
Furthermore, the Association of Independent Doctors (“AID”) op-
poses the removal of obstacles in Stark that will achieve coordinated
care but allow more self-referral within health care systems.275 The
AID represents over 1000 physician members from over thirty
states.276 This group argues that the major stakeholders in health care
have an ulterior motive and their suggestions to add a new value-
based exception are driven by financial gain.277 Moreover, the AID
argues that although “integrat[ing] care” and “manag[ing] risk” sound
positive, these terms are actually merely a cover to gain more control
of the marketplace by owning more physicians and clinics, thus creat-
ing monopolies.278 In its RFI response, AID stated that “the proposal
to soften or roll back Stark law, and the ‘associated fraud and abuse
laws,’ . . . is a thinly disguised effort for hospitals to gain permission to
financially reward doctors for referrals . . . .”279
Instead of adding additional exceptions to Stark, AID advocates for
transparency in pricing to keep health care costs down.280 AID con-
tends that “full transparency, that is letting consumers know before
they have a procedure what it will cost, and who would financially
benefit from facility fees, for instance, would help drive quality up and
costs down.”281 According to AID, “[t]ransparency is a bipartisan is-
sue all Americans want”; but special interests, “specifically hospital,
insurance, and pharmaceutical lobbies, stand in the way.”282
Finally, the AID concludes that shifting to value-based payments is
based on a faulty premise. The entire system is based on rewarding
providers for improved patient outcomes “when practically speaking,
no one knows how to measure value.”283 They argue that the attempts
to measure outcomes are flawed:
[W]hen doctors’ outcomes are based on “value” they will tend to
make patients look sicker on paper than they really are. This is no
different from emergency room doctors coaching patients who come
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Letter from Marni J. Carey, Exec. Director, Ass’n of Indep. Doctors Fl., to
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (July 26, 2018) (on file in regulations browser at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2018-0082-0034 [https://per]ma.cc/89
QX-WKTT]).
276. Membership, ASS’N. INDEP. DOCTORS, http://www.aid-us.org/join (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4WZV-D9C5].
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in with, say, abdominal pain into thinking they are also having chest
pain since a cardiac admission generates a higher reimburse-
ment[.]284
AID asserts that a value-based payment will incentivize providers to
manipulate outcomes in their own favor in order to receive greater
reimbursements.285 With opposing arguments on either side of this de-
bate, the public is awaiting the agency’s next step in amending the
Stark law.
D. CMS Confirms Stark Law Reform is Underway
As the public awaits CMS’s decision on how Stark will be reformed,
Seema Verma, Administrator for CMS, commented on this topic at
the Federation of American Hospitals 2019 Public Policy Conference.
On March 4, 2019, Ms. Verma specifically addressed upcoming
changes to Stark.286 Ms. Verma acknowledged that the majority of the
commenters believed that regulatory changes were needed to support
the move to value-based payments.287 She also acknowledged the
comments regarding the potential for program-integrity vulnerability
or other abuses.288 Moreover, Ms. Verma said that CMS is currently
working on changes to Stark based on the feedback, and she stated
these changes will reflect “the most significant changes to Stark law
since its inception.”289
In her speech to the Federation of American Hospitals, Ms. Verma
announced some of changes to expect. CMS will propose regulations
to clarify the definitions for “volume or value, commercial reasonable-
ness and fair market value.”290 Additionally, CMS will address the
areas of technical noncompliance, including the signature require-
ment.291 These remarks reflected that CMS listened to the com-
menters and will be addressing issues that were brought up in many of
the responses. Ms. Verma reiterated that CMS hopes that “these
changes will help spur better care coordination and help support
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See generally Seema Verma, Adm’r, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., Remarks at the Federation of American Hospitals 2019 Public Policy Confer-
ence (Mar. 4, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-re
leases/speech-remarks-administrator-seema-verma-federation-american-hospitals-
2019-public-policy-conference [https://perma.cc/DLB5-XNRL]) [hereinafter Verma





291. Id. In addition, she stated that CMS would be updating the regulation to ad-
dress a world in which there are cybersecurity and electronic health records require-
ments. Id.
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[CMS’s] work to remove barriers to innovation while continuing to
provide appropriate safeguards for [CMS’s] programs.”292
Equally important as to what Ms. Verma did address is what she did
not address.293 Based on her remarks, the public has some certainty
that CMS will clarify key definitions and ease some of the burdens of
technical noncompliance.294 Nevertheless, adding a value-based ex-
ception to the list of Stark exceptions was not touched upon.295 As
explained above, many stakeholders believe that a new value-based
exception is critical to the widespread adoption of a value-based care
model.296 However, a value-based exception was not addressed in Ms.
Verma’s comments.297
Without a new exception to allow value-based payment models on a
broad scale, CMS will fail in its effort to transform the system. The
Stark law is too complex. Likewise, there is insufficient guidance on
Stark to help businesses and physicians enter into new business ar-
rangements that are centered on integrated care and value-based pay-
ment. This problematic combination has a chilling effect on
innovation in health care business arrangements. Stakeholders will be
reluctant to attempt new models in light of the draconian penalties
should they inadvertently fall out of compliance with Stark. In order
to truly transform health care, hospitals, health systems, providers,
and other members of the community need clear rules that allow them
to enter into new business arrangements that can provide the value-
based care that CMS is seeking.
As the CMS RFI stated, “HHS is working to transform the health
care system into one that pays for value.”298 The question remains as
to whether the health care system can truly be transformed without a
broad new value-based exception that allows reimbursement to be
tied to value. As Dr. Ronald Paulus noted, the Stark law can[not] be
fixed by “tinkering around the edges.”299 CMS must balance the goal
of transforming the health care system into one that pays for value
292. Id. Ms. Verma expanded on the safeguards by announcing that CMS is also
revamping the Recovery Audit Contract, or RAC audits, to be more effective. Id.
293. Verma Remarks at Federation of American Hospitals, supra note 286.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See e.g., Letter from AAMC to Seema Verma (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www
.aamc.org/system/files/2019-12/ocomm-ogr-AAMC%20Comment%20Letter%20CM
S%20Stark%20Proposed%20Rule%2012.30.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/66VP-
3MUK]; PHILIPS, VALUE-BASED CARE (Apr. 2012 Position Paper), https://www
.philips.com/c-dam/b2bhc/de/innovation/vitalhealth/Value-based_care_position_paper
.pdf. [https://perma.cc/FGJ9-SELJ].
297. Verma Remarks at Federation of American Hospitals, supra note 286.
298. Medicare Program; Request for Information Regarding the Physician Self-Re-
ferral Law, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,524, 29,524 (June 25, 2018) (emphasis added).
299. Ayla Ellison, Stark Law: The 27-year-old Act Killing Health Care Reform
Before It Can Begin?, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.beckershos-
pitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/stark-law-the-27-year-old-act-killing-health
care-reform-before-it-can-begin.html [https://perma.cc/J8FG-MVZD].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 40 14-APR-20 15:32
612 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
while maintaining safeguards to ensure program integrity. Will CMS
continue to tinker around the edges, or will this new set of proposed
regulations significantly reform Stark and remove the longstanding
barriers to coordination of care? The health care community is anx-
iously awaiting the proposed regulations and will be greatly impacted
by the direction CMS chooses to take these reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
The health care crisis in our country demands attention on many
levels. Skyrocketing health care costs and a population that is in com-
paratively poor health have made health care reform one of the most
pressing topics in our government. Regulatory barriers exist, however,
that are preventing the type of reform that is needed. CMS is working
to transform our health care system into a system that pays for posi-
tive health outcomes as opposed to paying for individual services.
Currently, the Stark law is a barrier to the widespread adoption of this
type of value-based care model. The Stark law is ambiguous and com-
plex. The unpredictable interpretation of key terms by the courts, cou-
pled with the many complex technical requirements found in the
exceptions, make this strict-liability law incredibly problematic for the
health care industry. The Stark law should be reformed to clarify key
terms, provide more access to guidance, as well as allow for a new
value-based exception that will give providers the freedom to enter
into innovative business arrangements that focus on patient-care path-
ways and clinically integrated care. These reforms are necessary to
reshape health care delivery in the United States. The health care
community anxiously awaits the proposed regulations that seek to re-
form Stark and transform our health care system.
